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EMAD H. ATIQ

Why Motives Matter: Reframing the Crowding Out
Effect of Legal Incentives
ABSTRACT. Legal rules and regulations are routinely rationalized by appeal to the incentives
they create. This Note examines an important but misunderstood fact about incentives - namely,
that they often "crowd out" the natural motivations that citizens have to engage in socially
valued behavior, such as a sense of civic duty, a commitment to personal growth, and charity
towards others. The "crowding out effect" of incentives has traditionally been viewed as
problematic because of cases where it renders incentives counter-productive -when fear of legal
sanction or desire for financial reward substitutes for other forms of motivation in agents, this
often leads to less of the socially valued behavior regulators sought to incentivize. In contrast, I
explore whether the effect of legal incentives on our motivational psychology might be
inherently regrettable in some cases, quite apart from the effect on behavioral outcomes. I show
that a normative reframing of the crowding out effect that takes seriously the inherent value that
resides in our "higher motives" generates novel insights into a variety of legal phenomena,
including doctrinal rules in intellectual property, contracts, and torts; and a neglected theory for
legal reformation, one that bears on the choice between rule- and standard-based legal directives
and on the strategic use of the law to improve the way citizens conceptualize their obligations to
each other.
AUTHOR. Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2015; Princeton University, Department of
Philosophy, Ph.D. expected 2017. I would like to thank Ian Ayres, Shelly Kagan, Dan Kahan,
Daniel Markovits, Erin Miller, and Tom Tyler for discussion and/or feedback on initial drafts of
the paper. A special thanks to the editors at the Yale Law Journal-in particular, Benjamin
Eidelson and Matthew Letten-for their invaluable suggestions on how to improve the piece.
Thanks are also due to Sheza Atiq for reviewing the paper.
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INTRODUCTION

Capacityfor the noblerfeelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily
killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance . . . .
Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because
they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict
themselves to inferiorpleasures, not because they deliberatelyprefer them, but
because they are either the only ones to which they have access or the only ones
which they are any longer capable of enjoying.
-John Stuart Mill'
A powerful principle underlies much contemporary legal analysis and
regulatory design. The principle is that of the "incentive" -an extrinsic prompt
that induces agents to act in ways they might not otherwise by altering the
expected consequences of their actions. Often taking the form of financial
reward or punitive sanction, incentives do their work by raising the costs of
socially undesirable behavior or the benefits of socially desirable behavior.
Incentives thus compensate for the inadequacy of individuals' natural
motivations to behave in socially desirable ways and, unsurprisingly, pervade
contractual rules, tort duties of care, tax regulations, and virtually all other
areas of the law.
Despite the widely acknowledged benefits of generating incentives for good
behavior through the law, scholars have raised concerns about their pervasive
use.' One category of concern stems from the unintended costs of motivating
individuals by way of extrinsic prompts. A substantial body of empirical
research has shown that in many contexts individuals lose their natural or
"intrinsic" motivations for engaging in an activity when they are successfully
induced to participate in it for extrinsic reasons, like monetary reward or fear of
sanction.' Motivation grounded in a sense of civic duty, or a commitment to
self-improvement, or moral concern, appears undermined in the presence of
monetary and sanction-based incentives. Extrinsic motivation is said to "crowd
out" intrinsic motivation, and the phenomenon is commonly referred to as the
"crowding out effect." 4

1.

JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 10-11 (George Sher ed., 2d ed.

2.

3.

See sources cited infra note 5.
See infra Section II.B.

4.

See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15
590 (2001).
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WHY MOTIVES MATTER

In this Note, I explore a normative dimension to the crowding out effect
that has been neglected by previous scholarship. The crowding out effect, as
traditionally conceived, portrays legal incentives as potentially counterproductive; the net decline in intrinsic motivation often makes agents less likely
to engage in the activity regulators hoped to incentivize.s One might say that
the traditional conception of the phenomenon renders an internal critique of
legal incentives, one that questions whether incentives adequately satisfy their
purpose. There is a different way of regarding the crowding out phenomenon,
one that suggests an external critique of incentivizing, and it is this alternative
that I hope to develop in what follows.
I argue that quite apart from the effect on behavioral outcomes, the erosion
of intrinsic motivation is often worth regretting for its own sake. When an
increasing number of our actions are done for monetary reasons, or out of a
fear of punishment, and when this renders vulnerable such wellsprings of
motivation as a sense of fairness or a commitment to personal growth, the
effect on our values and motivational psychology is inherently bad.6 This

5.

See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protectionsfor Reporting Illegality, 88 TEx. L. Rv. 1151, 1152
(2010) ("[I]n some cases offering monetary rewards to whistle-blowers will lead to less,
rather than more, reporting of illegality."); Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, Motivating
Environmental Action in a Pluralistic Regulatory Environment: An Experimental Study of
Framing,Crowding Out, and InstitutionalEffects in the Context ofRecycling Policies, 46 LAw &
Soc'Y REV. 405 (2012) (assessing the influence of extrinsic incentives on intrinsic
motivations to recycle with the goal of designing the most efficient recycling policy); M.
Todd Henderson & Frederick Tung, Pay for RegulatorPerformance, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003,
1057-58 (2012) (positing that incentive pay could decrease the quality of bank examiners);
Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REv. 333, 338-39 (2001)
(discussing crowding out effects and arguing that "the advent of incentives will produce[]
less, not more, of such [desirable] behavior"); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Do Incentive
Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation? 2 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. Ctr. for Law, Econ.
& Org., Research Paper No. Col-3, 2001), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-id=229o47
("[Incentive contracts] are on average less efficient and elicit less effort from . . . agents,
than contracts that do not provide any incentives at all."). Even those authors who question
the extent of the crowding out effect take the same instrumentalist perspective. See Rebecca
Hollander-Blumoff, Intrinsicand Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Comment on Feldman, 35
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 53, 54 (2011) (focusing on the question of how crowding out effects
can be countered with larger penalties); Adam Oliver & Lawrence D. Brown, Incentivizing
Professionalsand Patients:A Considerationin the Context of the United Kingdom and the United
States, 36 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 59, 82-84 (2011) (noting that policymakers designing
incentives for health-care professions should be aware of the potential for crowding out,
"[a]lthough the evidence on the crowding-out of good practice is mixed").

6.

Michael Sandel, in a recent work, has appraised the crowding out effect of monetary
incentives with a similar emphasis on the harm inherent in motivational change. See
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normative conclusion is unaffected by the finding that extrinsic motivation is
more effective in driving socially desirable behavior. Socially optimal behavior,
under an incentives regime, may come at the cost of individuals failing to
develop a diverse and sufficiently rich set of reasons for acting. The existing
literature on the crowding out effect has failed to take seriously the possibility
that the character of our motives matters quite apart from the behavioral ends
that motives enable. 7
I demonstrate that the neglected moral dimension to the crowding out
effect has important consequences for widely debated questions of law and
policy. A normative framework that recognizes that legal incentives often
undermine motivations inherently worth preserving can be brought to bear on
the analysis of doctrinal rules in intellectual property, contracts, and torts.
Moreover, it sheds insight into the comparative performance of rule- and
standard-based legal directives, and the potential for using the law as a means
for moral education. The framework I develop is thus geared towards
emphasizing a normatively salient feature of the effect that laws have-a
feature that bears on important policy questions, but remains ignored in
debates about what the law should be.
The structure of the Note is as follows. In Part I, I introduce the theory of
incentives. I discuss the economic models of rational decision making that
underpin the theory, and provide examples of regulations informed by the
incentivizing approach. I introduce, in Part II, the crowding out phenomenon
as traditionally conceived. I refer to both the theoretical and empirical
considerations underpinning the view that incentives crowd out intrinsic
motivation.
The Parts that follow represent my contribution to the literature. In Part
III, I develop an original version of the crowding out critique of incentives. I

J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T Buy: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 45-46
I distinguish my view from Sandel's below. See infra note 72.
Indeed, even scholars with a more general interest in the effect of law on norms have stayed
true to the traditional approach: the interest in norms is motivated by an interest in their
effectiveness at getting us more of the behavioral outcomes we care about. See, e.g., Jonathan
M. Barnett, The Rational Underenforcementof Vice Laws, 54 RuTGERS L. REV. 423 (2002); Dan
M. Kahan, The Logic ofReciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71, 72
(2003) ("[M]anipulating material incentives may not only be an inefficient regulatory
strategy for solving collective-action problems; it may often be a self-defeating one."); John
Quiggin & Dan Hunter, Money Ruins Everything, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 203, 21415 (2008) (observing that financial incentives are unlikely to be effective at motivating
"amateur creators" to create art); see also infra Section II.C (reviewing the existing
scholarship's instrumental interest in the crowding out effect).
MICHAEL
(2012).

7.
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explain how our motivations can be distinguished, descriptively and morally,
and why having the right motives matters from the agent's perspective. I argue
that incentives interfere with our individual aspirations to be the best versions
of ourselves because our considered preferences regarding our ideal selves are
irreducibly preferences over motives and ways of valuing things in the world.
Furthermore, certain valued ways of relating with others positively require that
individuals cultivate and routinely give expression to motivations like kindness
and reciprocal respect. Incentives interfere with the cultivation of such forms of
motivation.
Then, in Part IV, I demonstrate how the moral insights gleaned in Part III
have practical value for lawmakers. One set of examples proceeds from the
observation that existing legal doctrines evince a reluctance on the part of
lawmakers to implement legal incentives in certain spheres of human activity for instance, those involving scientific enterprise, marital relations, and giftgiving. This disinclination finds a partial explanation (or normative
justification) in the importance of motive-preservation: certain valued ways of
caring should not be undermined by the law. The examples discussed include
the "law of nature" restriction on patentable subject matter, the
unenforceability of donative promises that have not been relied upon, and the
declining reputation of heart balm laws. Next, I show that the theory generates
insights into the trans-substantive debate over the choice between bright-line
rules and open-textured standards as legal directives. I argue that a neglected
benefit of using standards as a legal form is that, in certain contexts, standards
mitigate the crowding out effect by giving private actors a chance to exercise
their intrinsic motives and higher interests. Standards thus are advantageous in
domains governed by the law where we think it is important for individuals to
cultivate good character. I illustrate this principle using examples of standards
in Fourth Amendment search-and-seizure doctrine, trade secret law, and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, I make brief note of how the law can
be employed strategically, on account of its effect on motivation, to improve
the way citizens conceptualize their obligations to each other, using the
example of the tax code's incentive effects. It bears emphasizing that I do not
purport to offer complete causal explanations or normative justifications of the
legal phenomena I analyze. Rather, the examples I discuss are illustrative of the
potential for a normative theory that reframes the crowding out effect in the
manner I propose to generate new and powerful (if incomplete) insights into
the law.
As a final introductory remark, it is worth emphasizing at the outset that
this Note is not intended as a jeremiad against incentives, market norms, or
excessive regulation. It is, rather, an attempt to show how we can put to work,
in a hardheaded manner, an important yet ignored moral insight regarding the
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use of legal incentives (which undeniably do a lot of good for society). One of
my chief purposes in opening with the quote of Mill, the great advocate of
utilitarianism, is to convey that my normative arguments will have a certain
flavor that economists and progressive regulators might find attractive. Where
others have appealed to under-analyzed notions of "sanctity" and "corruption"
to explain why motivating agents to do certain kinds of things (donate organs,
for instance) destroys the good in the achieved outcomes, I do not seek to
undermine the value inherent in socially desirable behavior even when it
transpires under an incentives regime. The question of whether the outcome of
an action is good for society can be separated from the question of what is good
for the agent engaged in the action; the latter question has to do with the kinds
of persons we want to be. This Note offers a meditation on the role of the law
in enabling or inhibiting our self-realization.
I.

LAW AND THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES

In this Part, I discuss the theory of incentives, and the economic models of
rational decision making that undergird it. I offer examples of the ways in
which the theory has been applied to the law and the regulations it has
inspired.

8.

The views I develop here should also be of special interest to scholars contributing to the
development of "virtue jurisprudence" -an approach to the law that draws on "virtue
ethics" and its emphasis on character to develop theories of judging, see, e.g., Lawrence B.
Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34 METAPHILOSOPHY 178
(2003), analyses of legal standards of prudence and care, see, e.g., Heidi Li Feldman,
Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1431
(2000), and general justifications of legal requirements and prohibitions, see, e.g., Sherman
Clark, Neoclassical Public Virtues: Towards an Aretaic Theory of Law-Making (and Law
Teaching), in LAw, VIRTUE, AND JUSTICE 81 (Amalia Amaya & Ho Hock Lai eds., 2012). I
share the virtue ethicist's sense of the importance of the agent's character as a component of
her wellbeing, although I believe that the importance of virtue -or, given my focus, good
motives -can be captured within a traditional consequentialist or deontological moral
framework, without recourse to a "third way" in ethics. More importantly, I draw attention
in this Note to a feature of the effect that laws have that existing scholarship in the virtuejurisprudential tradition has ignored despite the fact that this feature - namely, the
motivational transfer that legal incentives cause -can be normatively evaluated out of a
concern for character. I highlight new ways in which the law can promote traits associated
with virtue (by getting out of certain domains of human endeavor, by using standard-based
legal directives, and by strategically crowding out motives that are less than virtuous). See
infra Parts III-IV.

1076

WHY MOTIVES MATTER

A. An EconomicApproach to Human Behavior
A simple yet powerful model of human behavior underlies modern
microeconomics, and it has been productively applied to a number of
contemporary social problems. This model - dubbed the "rational actor model"
of human behavior- supposes that individuals, in deciding which course of
action to take, assess the costs and benefits of possible actions and act so as to
maximize their expected benefits. In his seminal piece The Economic Approach to
Human Behavior, Gary Becker observed that the rational actor model has
helped characterize and explain behavioral outcomes not only in those spheres
of human conduct traditionally understood to be amenable to economic
analysis-such as buying and selling in markets-but also in such
unconventional spheres as marriage. 9
Two features of the approach are worthy of emphasis. One important
feature is the way that the cost-benefit framework simplifies the preferences of
individuals. Economists, of course, recognize that behavior is driven by a much
richer set of values and preferences than the cost-benefit dichotomy implies.
Individuals might act out of a sense of moral duty, or filial loyalty, or a desire
for truth and beauty. Nevertheless, economists make the simplifying but useful
assumption that individuals ultimately combine the goods and bads as they see
them into a single expected utility function, and act so as to maximize that
function. The goods and bads in the world, whether viewed as such out of a
sense of moral duty or a love of money, are added up and weighed against each
other to determine the overall payoff of a course of action. The second relevant
feature of the economic approach to human behavior is the focus on outcomes
of individual choices. The theory is geared towards predicting how people will
act, and interrogates how the payoff structure facing agents should be managed
in order to generate more of the behavioral outcomes we care about. The
theory suggests that regulators should focus on deterring individuals who are
inclined towards types of conduct we deem socially undesirable by increasing
the costs of engaging in that type of conduct. Alternatively, regulators should
deploy the instruments of social policy to artificially increase the benefits
derived from engaging in socially desirable behavior.o

9.

See GARY S. BECKER,

lo. See, e.g.,

THE ECONOMIC APPROACH To HUMAN BEHAVIOR 8,17 (1976).

IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES TO GET

THINGS DONE (2010); STEVEN

D.

LEVITT & STEPHEN

J. DUBNER,

FREAKONOMICS:

ECONOMIST ExPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING (2005);
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 7 (6th ed. 2012).

N.

A ROGUE

GREGORY MANKIW,
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The rational actor model and the incentivizing logic it inspires result in a
policy focus on generating incentives to compensate for the inadequacies of our
natural instincts. As Samuel Bowles puts it, "the burden of good governance
shift[s] from the task of cultivating civic virtue to the challenge of designing
institutions that work tolerably well in its absence.""
B. The Law as an Enginefor Incentives
The incentives approach has revolutionized legal theory. Contractual rules,
property rights, and tort duties of care are routinely rationalized by appeal to
the ways in which they incentivize individuals with self-regarding preferences
to implement outcomes that are socially valued, but may not be sought absent
the relevant rule. Contracts are enforced against promisors who breach when
doing so creates legal incentives for contractual reliance in a way that
maximizes the surplus associated with contractual arrangements.'" The patent
regime is defended by appeal to the increased number of inventions that
become available to society due to the incentive effects of granting monopoly
rights for new inventions." Tort law-in particular, the ways in which the
regime imposes costs on individuals via damages-is conceptualized as a
system for incentivizing potential injurers and victims to minimize the cost of
accidents by optimally investing in safety.'
Many federal and state statutes have also been designed with an eye
towards the incentives they create. Deliberate incentives can be found in tax

ii.
12.

Samuel Bowles, Machiavelli's Mistake: Why Good Laws Are No Substitute for Good Citizens,
SANTE FE INST. &U. SIENA 3 (2010), http://www.santafe.edu/~bowles/Machiavelli.pdf.
See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, ContractTheory and the Limits of ContractLaw, 113
YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003).

13.

See, e.g., Petra Moser, How Do Patent Laws Influence Innovation? Evidencefrom NineteenthCentury World Fairs 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9909, 2003),

http://www.nber.org/papers/w99o9.pdf ("Patent laws are designed to create the optimal
incentives for innovation . . . ").
14.

See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAw (1987); see also Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 169 (1968) (determining optimal enforcement of criminal laws using economic
principles).
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regulations,"s environmental laws,'6 and rules designed to financially
compensate and thereby encourage whistleblowing.17 In Dallas, Texas, second
graders received payments for reading books to incentivize positive educational
outcomes.'8 In the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Justice introduced a
program that pays prisons based on how well they rehabilitate offenders.
Unsurprisingly, many find such initiatives controversial.2 o
II. THE CROWDING OUT EFFECT: THEORY & EVIDENCE

In this Part, I discuss evidence suggesting that legal incentives can in some
cases erode a person's "intrinsic" motives to engage in a course of action,
whether those motives stem from a sense of civic duty, a sense of fairness, or
other personal commitments. I describe, first, the psychological theories that
purport to explain why the "crowding out effect" occurs, and, second, the
relevant experimental data.
A. When Incentives Do the Work ofIntrinsicMotivation: Crowding Out Theory
Actions can be undertaken for a variety of reasons. It is widely recognized
that motivations for following the law, for instance, are diverse, and range

15.

See, e.g., Sean M. Stegmaier, Tax Incentivesfor HigherEducation in the Internal Revenue Code:
Education Tax Expenditure Reform and the Inclusion of Refundable Tax Credits, 37 Sw. U. L.
REV. 135, 137 (2008) (noting incentives in the tax code).

16.

See, e.g., Adam Babich, A New Era in Environmental Law,
(noting laws intended to create environmental incentives).

17.

See, e.g., Feldman & Lobel, supra note

5, at

20

COLo. LAW. 435, 435 (1991)

1168-72 (studying whistleblowing statutes and

the incentives they create).
18. See Amanda Ripley, Should Kids Be Bribed to Do Well in School?, TIME, Apr. 8, 2010,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/o,9171,1978758-3,oo.html.
ig. See Andrew Neilson, Counterblast:Putting a Price on Rehabilitation:Payment by Results and the
March of the Market in Prisonsand Probation,5P How. J. CluM. JuST. 419 (2012). Economists
have proposed increasingly sophisticated incentivizing devices. See, e.g., Michael
Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Compensating Commitments: The Law and Economics of
Commitment Bonds that Compensate for the Possibility of Forfeiture (May 10, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1612396.
20. See, e.g., SANDEL, supra note 6, at 43, 79-80 (noting criticisms of programs that pay drugaddicted mothers to undergo sterilization and those that allow hunters to pay large sums to
hunt an endangered rhino); Neilson, supra note 19.
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from an internalized sense of duty to a fear of sanctions." A driver may obey
speed limits to avoid a traffic ticket, or out of respect for the legal system, or
some combination of both. Psychologists often distinguish motivations that are
"intrinsic" from those that are "extrinsically" driven. Edward Deci states that
"[o]ne is said to be intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when he
receives no apparent rewards except the activity itself."2 2 Extrinsic motivation
to engage in a course of action locates the action's payoff externally-such as
payments to be received from an interested third party in return for
performance of the act. The intrinsic-extrinsic divide may be difficult to apply
at the margins, but it is a firmly established distinction in the social sciences.
Legal incentives, paradigmatically, take the form of an extrinsic promptthey produce extrinsic motivation in the agent by making a course of action
more attractive through the promise of monetary payments or the threat of
sanction. A number of theorists have suggested that incentives compete with or
"crowd out" the agent's intrinsic (or otherwise non-legal) motivation to engage
in an activity." The phenomenon has acquired a number of different names in
the literature, reflecting subtle differences in the way it has been
conceptualized, including the "crowding out effect," the "over-justification
effect," and the "corruption effect."'
There are at least three competing theoretical explanations of the effect.
According to "self-determination" theorists, individuals who are extrinsically
motivated experience their actions as controlled by others, especially if the
extrinsic prompt arises due to an identifiable third party. Over time, the
experience of engaging in an activity for someone willing to reward
performance or punish non-performance deprives actors of the sense that the
activity can be an object of self-initiated choice, which in turn undermines their

21.

See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation ofNorms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (observing that individuals are motivated to follow the law for a
variety of reasons).

22.

Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18

J.

PERSONALITY& Soc. PSYCHOL. 105, 105 (1971).
23.

See, e.g., RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL

POLICY 314 (1997) (concluding that "the commercialization of blood and donor relationships

represses the expression of altruism" and "erodes the sense of community").
24.

See generally THE HIDDEN COSTS OF REWARD: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF

HUMAN MOTIVATION (Mark R. Lepper & David Greene eds., 1978) (reviewing literature on

the crowding out effects of rewards).
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tendency to exhibit intrinsic motivation." An alternative view suggests that
external rewards and punishments change the meaning of actions by making
the agent overlook prior reasons for acting and by shifting her focus to a
particular set of (extrinsic) considerations. In other words, "external rewards
create an over-justification effect whereby people assume that their deeds are
due to the external rewards and not owing to their intrinsic motivations."26 A

third view suggests that extrinsic prompts deprive the individual of the chance
to exhibit her intrinsic motivations to others, which, in turn, undermines the
value to the individual of having intrinsic motives.' On this view, an inability
to advance an impression of oneself as motivated by "higher values," like truth
and morality, diminishes the importance of having the relevant motivations. As
a result of their inability, when incentivized, to reliably signal their intrinsic
motives to others, agents exhibit what Bruno Frey calls "altruistic anger,"
which involves a relinquishing of altruistic and other intrinsic motives
altogether."
The objective of this Note is not to settle which, if any, of the theories is
correct. The theories presented are plausible explanations of the evidence to
follow, and thus serve a useful contextualizing function. The arguments
advanced in Parts III and IV-in particular, the argument that situates the
crowding out effect within moral theory-do not depend on any particular
view of the effect's origins or underlying basis. Nonetheless, certain of the
theories, if correct, should reinforce the moral points made in Part III more
than others -especially a theory that locates the crowding out effect in the
agent's experience of herself as an autonomous agent."'

25. Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Empirical Exploration of Intrinsic Motivational
Processes, in 13 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 39, 43-44 (Leonard
Berkowitz ed., 1980) (noting that rewards diminish intrinsic motivation by shifting the
agent's perceived locus of causality).
26. Yuval Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance
Motivations: Theoretical and EmpiricalInsights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 11, 24 (2011).
27.

Bruno Frey, Crowding Out and CrowdingIn ofIntrinsic Preferences, in REFLEXIVE
FOR GLOBAL PUBLIc GOODS 75-78 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds.,

GOVERNANCE

2012).

Id.
29. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28.
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B. Evidencefor the Crowding Out Effect
Natural experiments offer the most compelling illustrations of the
crowding out effect. Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini examined the effects of a
day care center's introduction of a fine against parents who arrive late in
picking up their children. 3 o Traditional deterrence models, based on the
rational actor assumptions of economic theory, would suggest that because
fines increase the costs to parents of being late, they should lead to a reduction
in the number of late pick-ups. Contrary to expectation, the number of late
parents increased after the fine was introduced.3 ' Gneezy and Rustichini
considered the possibility that parents assumed that the fines were being paid
to teachers who had to stay late to look after their children, and that they were
purchasing a service rather than imposing a nuisance. The experimenters
pointed out that such an explanation is difficult to square with the fact that the
payments were described as "fines" and the increase in late parents persisted
even after the fine was removed."
Another experiment, reported by Bruno Frey and Felix Oberholzer-Gee,
revealed the effects of incentives on the willingness of citizens to
disproportionately bear the costs of a project desirable to the overall
community." The Swiss Parliament wanted to build a nuclear waste
repository, which was widely recognized to be a worthwhile project, with
considerable benefits for a number of localities. Individuals, however, were
expected to resent the facility being built within their own locality, considering
that it would entail their bearing more of the total cost than citizens living
elsewhere. In other words, the building of the waste facility was a classic
collective action problem, referred to in the literature as a Not in My Backyard
(NIMBY) problem. In an effort to make the proposal more attractive, the
government considered financially compensating those who agreed to put up
with the repository. The region was widely surveyed, and the results showed
that while half of the respondents who were not offered compensation agreed
to have the facility built within their locality, the level of acceptance dropped to
one quarter among those who were offered amounts ranging from $2,175 to

30.

Uri Gneezy &Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.

31.

Id. at 15.

32.

Id. at 14.

33.

See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost ofPrice Incentives: An EmpiricalAnalysis
ofMotivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REv. 746 (1997).

1082

1 (2000).

WHY MOTIVES MATTER

$6,525." Frey and Oberholzer-Gee tested for the possibility that citizens'
acceptance level declined because they inferred from the offer of compensation
that the magnitude of harm caused by the facility was significantly greater, by
asking respondents whether they thought the size of compensation was linked
to the level of risk. Only six percent inferred such a connection. Excluding
alternative explanations, the authors concluded that "public spirit" declined
when the state attempted to buy out individuals. Monetary incentives crowded
out intrinsic motivations to accept the project, such as a sense of civic duty."s A
similar study has replicated this effect in Pennsylvania. 6
In addition to these real-world experiments, scholars have extensively
studied the crowding out effect, and the results have been widely replicated.
Based on surveys of a panel of over two thousand employees, Yuval Feldman
demonstrated that regulatory mechanisms that financially reward
whistleblowers often lead to less, rather than more, reporting of illegal
activity-such as tax evasion or fraudulent commercial practices-by
undermining ethical motives to report.17 Moreover, a number of metaanalytical studies have summarized the extensive empirical research on the
crowding out effect. 8 A meta-analysis of 128 studies over three decades
conducted by Edward Deci et al. concluded that the crowding out effect is a
robust phenomenon, and many kinds of tangible rewards for socially desirable
behavior undermine intrinsic motivation.39

34.

Id. at 749-50.

Id. at 753.
36. Felix Oberholzer-Gee & Howard Kunreuther, Social Pressuresin Siting Conflicts:A Case Study
35.

of Siting a Radioactive Waste Repository in Pennsylvania, in MANAGING CONFLICT IN FACILITY
SITING: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 85 (S. Hayden Lesbirel & Daigee Shaw eds., 200S).

See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 5; see also Yuval Feldman & Oren Perez, How Law Changes
the Environmental Mind: An Experimental Study of the Effect of Legal Norms on Moral
Perceptions and Civic Enforcement, 36 J.L. & Soc'Y 501 (2009) (noting that individuals are
more tolerant of polluting behavior when it is fined or taxed); Frey & Jegen, supra note 4, at
598-600 (describing studies that suggest that incentive contracts crowd out reciprocitybased willingness to work).
38. See Frey & Jegen, supra note 4; see also Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundationsof
37.

Incentives, 46 EUR. EcON. REv. 687, 709-10 (2002) (summarizing previous research in this

area); Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, DetrimentalEffects of Sanctions on Human Altruism,
422 NATURE 137, 140 (2003) (same).

39. Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on IntrinsicMotivation, 125 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 627, 627 (1999); see also Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, The

Undermining Effect Is a Reality After All-Extrinsic Rewards, Task Interest, and Self-
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Crucially, for our purposes, the crowding out effect has not only been
shown to occur through monetary incentives; prompts such as threats,
surveillance, and deadlines also lead to the erosion of motives like ethical
concern and a commitment to self-improvement. 4o For instance, in a classic
and much discussed study, Richard Schwartz and Sonya Orleans demonstrated
that emphasizing social norms and civic virtue had a greater effect on
encouraging honesty in tax reporting than did threatening individuals with
legal sanctions.41

Of course, legal prohibitions and rewards need not always have the
crowding out effect, and in some cases may reinforce the perception that a form
of conduct is intrinsically worth doing.42 For instance, scholars have argued
that sanctions that look more like punishments rather than prices are less likely
to induce crowding out.43 Relatedly, an act done out of a sense of legal duty is
not always reducible to one performed merely out of a fear of legal sanctions.
Respect for the law may be folded into such forms of classically intrinsic
concerns as a sense of moral and civic duty. Nevertheless, the crowding out
effect of sanctions and monetary reward is an observable and significant
phenomenon." The aim of this Note is not to tease apart cases in which
crowding out does or does not occur, but to build a normative framework

40.

41.

Determination:Reply to Eisenberger, Pierce, and Cameron (1999) and Lepper, Henderlong, and
Gingras (1990), 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 692 (1999) (critically discussing independent metaanalyses of research on the crowding out effect conducted by various authors). But see
Robert Eisenberger, W. David Pierce & Judy Cameron, Effects of Reward on Intrinsic
Motivation -Negative, Neutral, and Positive: Comment on Deci, Koestner, and Ryan (1999), 125
PSYCHOL. BULL. 677, 677 (1999) (observing that "reward can decrease, have no effect, or
increase intrinsic motivation"). Bruno Frey and Reno Jegen find that the disconfirming
studies by Eisenberger, Pierce, and Cameron have significant shortcomings. See Frey &
Jegen, supra note 4, at 597-98.
See Frey, supra note 27, at 79 ("Intrinsic motivation is potentially affected by all kinds of
intervention coming from outside the person considered. Thus, not only rewards, but also
commands may crowd out intrinsic motivation."); Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, An
Overview ofSelf-Determination Theory: An Organismic-DialecticalPerspective,in HANDBOOK OF
SELF-DETERMINATION RESEARCH 3, 12 (Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan eds., 2002).
See Richard D. Schwartz & Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U.

CHI.

L. REV.

274, 299

(1967).
42.

See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 26, at 15; Feldman & Lobel, supra note 5, at 1181 ("[T]here is a

documented difference between small, intermediate, and high payoffs, such that
intermediate payoffs trigger crowding-out effects most often."); Yuval Feldman & Doron
Teichman, Are All "Legal Dollars" CreatedEqual?, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 223, 225 (2008).
43. Feldman & Teichman, supra note 42, at 225.
44. See Frey &Jegen, supra note 4.
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around the cases where it does. The fact that it often does, as the studies
discussed demonstrate, is well established.
C. The TraditionalView ofWhy Crowding Out Is a Problem: IntrinsicMotives
as Mere Means
Policy interest in the crowding out phenomenon stems principally from the
worry that it renders incentives counter-productive. Scholars have argued that
in certain contexts the positive impact of incentives may be nullified by the
erosion of intrinsic motivation, and that, as individuals stop acting out of a
sense of good will or civic duty, this might even have the opposite result to
what regulators intend.45 For instance, Maarten Vansteenkiste et al. argue that
in the educational context, experiments suggest that emphasizing the intrinsic
value of learning activities "produces deeper engagement in learning activities,
better conceptual learning, and higher persistence" than does motivating
individuals through extrinsic rewards.46 In the context of whistleblowing,
Yuval Feldman and Orly Lobel observe that sometimes "financial incentives are
not only unnecessary but are counterproductive and offset internal motivations
to report."' "Identifying such crowding out effects in regulatory design is
particularly beneficial," they suggest, "as it can save public dollars while
simultaneously pointing to better mechanisms to induce reporting."" The
thrust of the mainstream policy argument for the significance of the crowding
out effect is just that intrinsic motivation is sometimes better at achieving
desired behavioral outcomes than extrinsic motivation.
In fact, even legal scholars who have an interest in the way that the law
affects the norms of individuals quite apart from the crowding out effect have
an instrumental perspective on the value of norms-one that emphasizes the
consequences of social norms on such behavioral outcomes as compliance with
the law.49 Cass Sunstein, for instance, observes that "[f]ar too little attention

45.
46.

See sources cited supra note 5.
Maarten Vansteenldste, Willy Lens & Edward L. Deci, Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Goal Contents
in Self-Determination Theory: Another Look at the Quality of Academic Motivation, 41 EDUC.
PSYCHOLOGIST 19, 19 (20o6).

47.

Feldman &Lobel, supra note 5, at 1207.

48.

Id.

49.

See, e.g., Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock and Roll, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651,
720-22 (2006) (arguing that reinforcing norms of reciprocity and fairness is useful for
promoting legal compliance); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L.
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has been given to the place of norms in human behavior, to the relationship
between norms and law, and to the control of norms as an instrument of legal
policy."so In particular, he emphasizes that influencing what individuals care
about can improve social wellbeing-that using the law to modify what
individuals are motivated by can have positive effects on dieting, sexual
behavior, and drug-use. The focus, in other words, is on the instrumental value
of regulating the motivational psychology of individuals. s1
Another category of interest in the crowding out effect connects with the
importance of intrinsic motivation -"levels of generosity, fairmindedness, and
civic involvement" - to liberal institutions.s2 Samuel Bowles observes that social
norms that generate intrinsic motivation stabilize the civic culture of liberal
societies and engender supportive moral attitudes that contribute to the
flourishing of democracy and rule of law. He emphasizes that public policies
need to "account for the fact that moral motives are a fragile resource likely to
be attenuated by explicit incentives,"s" but does so from a consequentialist
point of view-we care about the relevant sources of intrinsic motivation only
for their effect on the stability of the liberal and economic institutions we care
about independently.
What motivates existing literature on the crowding out effect is a highly
instrumental view of the value of intrinsic motivation. Intrinsic (or otherwise
non-legal) motives of agents matter, on the popular view, because they
conduce to better learning outcomes, greater tax compliance, and more
stability in liberal institutions. In the remainder of this Note, I develop a
distinct view of the problem inherent in the crowding out phenomenon, and
explain why theorists and lawmakers should pay attention to its neglected
normative dimension.
While the basic intuition-that intrinsic motivation can be valuable to
agents for its own sake-is quite explicit in the broader psychological literature,
that intuition has not been explored in a systematic way to render a moral

See generally Yuval Feldman & Robert J. MacCoun, Some Well-Aged
Wines for the "New Norms" Bottles: Implications of Social Psychologyfor Law and Economics, in
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 358 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L.
Smith eds., 2005) (describing the interest in social norms for their effectiveness in
promoting desirable behavior).
REV. 903, 907 (1996).

so.

CAss R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 34 (1997).

51.

Sunstein, supra note 49, at 907-08.

52.

s3.

Bowles, supra note ii, at 4-6.
Id. at 6.
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framework for evaluating the crowding out effect (let alone one that is also
geared towards legal application). For instance, Edward Deci and Richard
Ryan demonstrate experimentally that being motivated intrinsically yields
positive benefits for individual well-being, and that, conversely, when
individuals feel extrinsically controlled it undermines their healthy
Similarly, Julia Annas's work on the
psychological development.'
"phenomenology of virtue" observes that agents find the pursuit of goals that
are treated as intrinsically valuable subjectively rewarding." I am, of course, in
agreement with the psychological literature on these points, and take the
experimental work to reinforce the normative argument I advance. My
argument for taking motives seriously, however, encompasses more than just
the thought that being intrinsically motivated is experienced as rewarding by
agents. In what follows, I try to show not only that we do have preferences
regarding our motivations, but also that these preferences have a special sort of
importance for us, tolerate normative scrutiny, and enjoy remarkable intersubjective agreement. Moreover, I go some way towards showing why we value
various forms of intrinsic motivation in the way that we do. What is offered, in
other words, is a more systematic philosophical grounding of the basic
intuition -that the loss of intrinsic motivation can be harmful to agents quite
apart from the effect on behavioral outcomes - and an attempt to fold it into an
original analysis of the crowding out effect for purposes of legal design.
III. WHY THE CHARACTER OF OUR MOTIVATIONS MATTERS:
REFRAMING THE CROWDING OUT EFFECT

The harm that results from the crowding out effect sometimes inheres in
the motivational transfer. This can be shown by appeal to the considered
preferences of agents and the fact that certain valued relationships are
constituted by specific modes of motivational concern. But first, I point to the
ways in which motivations can be distinguished as a descriptive matter.

54. Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination Theory and the FacilitationofIntrinsic
Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 68, 68 (2000).
s5. Julia Annas, The Phenomenology of Virtue, 7 PHENOMENOLOGY & COGNITIVE SCI. 21, 29 n.22

(2008) (engaging with Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi's work, which observes that having
intrinsic goals is experienced as rewarding by people); see also MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI,
FLOW:

THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE

(1991)

(describing

the

uniquely

pleasurable states achieved through intense absorption and heightened concentration during
an activity).
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A. Groundsfor DistinguishingMotivations
There is a view that I suspect many are tempted by, according to which
there is little that can be said in the way of distinguishing motives: beneath the
surface diversity of desires and reasons for acting, one ultimately finds an
unrelenting concern for the self. Debunking a monistic view about
motivation -a view that claims, for example, that we are always motivated by
what we perceive to be in our own self-interest -is important to the argument
advanced in this Part, because the thought that the character of our motives
matters morally presupposes that motivations can be descriptively
distinguished. There is no more reason to think that our various desires are
ultimately indistinguishable than there is to think that there is a single, unitary
part of our brains that always lights up when we desire a thing.
The work of distinguishing motivations might begin with a distinction
explored by the philosopher Bernard Williams, who pointed out that not every
desire can be represented as the desire to avoid its own frustration. 6 Certain
desires motivate agents in a way that renders the motive not merely one of
avoiding the unpleasantness of not getting what one wants. In the grip of such
desires, one wants to be released of the discomforts of desiring in a specific
way. Consider my desire for financial security for my loved ones. It would be
absurd to suggest that I would be indifferent between a world in which my
loved ones are in fact financially secure and a world in which I am deluded into
thinking that they are, or, for that matter, a world in which I no longer have
the relevant desire. In contrast, some desires do render the desirer indifferent
between two ways in which the desire might be satisfied. Consider a run-ofthe-mill "itch"; I am genuinely indifferent between a world in which I am
released of my desire to scratch my back through medical intervention or
simulated relief, and a world in which I, in fact, scratch my back.
Desires can be distinguished on the basis of what they aim at (what they
portray as desirable)." A desire for a state of affairs that proceeds from
considerations of personal advantage can be distinguished from a desire that
proceeds from values like concern for others, or a desire to know the truth.
Whereas a self-regarding desire might "aim" at the actor's own pleasure, an
other-regarding desire "aims" at the good of others. To connect back with
Williams's point, the agent wants to be released of desires that aim at the good

56.

57.

Bernard Williams, The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality, in
LANGUAGE, METAPHYSICS, AND DEATH 231 (John Donnelly ed., 1994).
See, e.g., T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 50-51 (1998).
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of others in a very specific way-where the good of others in fact obtains. Not
all desires portray pleasure or self-advancement as the good to be attained."
This truth is resilient to what the biological sciences or sociological
investigation might tell us about why we desire such things as the good of
others. Even if it was originally an association with pleasure that supported in
us a desire for friendship and sociality, mere force of habit can turn that desire
into one that portrays human companionship as desirable for its own sake.
A further fact about desires worth highlighting is that their lived experience
varies. Caring about the good of others is phenomenologically unlike caring
about the accumulation of wealth. To put the point in a flat-footed way, caring
about the good of others feels different from caring about wealth
accumulation-it involves a unique cluster of attitudes and emotions. Most of
us should have introspective access to this important feature of our desires.
Finally, desires can be distinguished in terms of how robustly situated they
are in the web of interests and preferences that constitute an identity. The more
closely we identify with a desire, the less likely we are to accept the kind of
personality transformation that rids us of the desire, notwithstanding the
benefits of being released from the burdens of desiring, which include the
discomfort experienced until desire-satisfaction, and the burdens that come
from trying to satisfy the desire. Harry Frankfurt tracks the robustness of a
desire relative to the degree to which it suitably meshes with other elements of
an agent's psychology, such as her "second-order desires."" A first-order desire
might take a particular action as its object, such as donating to charity, whereas
a second-order desire is a desire for other desires. A first-order desire (a want
to help others, say) backed by a second-order desire to have the first-order
desire (a want to want to help others) enjoys, in a fairly intuitive sense, the
agent's reflective endorsement, and becomes more central to her identity by
virtue of its enhanced stability. Not all of our first-order desires enjoy our
reflective endorsement in this way.
B. Motives, Self-Definition, and OrientingOneself Towards the Good
To recap, we can distinguish desires on the basis of what they portray as
good or desirable, the extent to which desires cohere with other elements of an
agent's motivational psychology, and desires as unique "lived experiences." On

58.

See id. at 80-90.

sg. Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept ofa Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5 (1971).
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the back of these distinctions, I motivate the view that cultivating certain ways
of desiring is an intrinsic good.
In his masterwork on utilitarianism, John Stuart Mill defends a version of
the view that all that matters, ethically speaking, is human pleasure (and its
corollary: the absence of pain). But in doing so, Mill makes the following
important qualification: not all pleasuresare created equal."o Mill's defense of the
qualification turns out to be quite illuminating for our purposes, though we
need not share his ultimate conclusions -for instance, the conclusion that all
that matters, ethically, is pleasure. Mill boldly asserts that were we to consult
our own experiences, we would agree with him that certain pleasures are
inherently better for us than other pleasures, and not simply in terms of the
sheer quantity of pleasure experienced. The higher pleasures are privileged
because of their richness-a richness purportedly apparent to those who have
experienced them."
There are two aspects of Mill's argument that are notable for our purposes.
The first suggests a point about methodology -Mill recognized that normative
claims are experienced as compelling when they connect with our own
normative experiences. To persuade us that the pleasure derived from hardearned intellectual or aesthetic achievements is superior to the pleasure derived
from a back massage, he appeals to our own attitudes towards the two
pleasures. The second notable feature of the argument is that Mill draws our
attention to the phenomenology of distinct pleasures -what different pleasures
are like experientially- to motivate a normative hierarchy of pleasures."
My argument, here, is Millian. It appeals to introspective experiences that I
expect the reader and I share. We make inter-subjective distinctions of worth
amongst various desires and ways of valuing. We routinely exercise the
capacity to examine our desires critically. We might celebrate our ethical
concerns, for instance, or our intellectual interests, or our musical likes and
dislikes, or our sports preferences. Even when we do endorse particular cares,

6o. MILL, supra note i, at 8-io.

61.

Id. at 8-9.

62.

My argument partially shares this feature of Mill's. One way in which I motivate the idea
that there are better or worse motivations is by observing that agents are capable of
distinguishing, based on their own experiences, between preferred and less-preferred
motivations, and there is considerable inter-subjective agreement about what motivations
should be preferred. The way in which particular motivations (or, for that matter, particular
pleasures) become objectively superior in light of our considered preferences implicates
difficult questions in the metaphysics of value; I offer my all-too-brief answers to such
questions infra note 72.
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they are never fully immune to further challenge -although some desires and
ways of valuing may tolerate scrutiny better than others. In other words, we
have considered preferences regarding the kinds of motivated beings we want to
be. I highlight, in what follows, that these preferences portray modes of
motivation as desirable for more than just the behavioral ends they facilitate:
we value our motivational concerns for the experiential richness that resides in
having them, and certain desires cohere better with our independently held
judgments of the good.
The first thing to say regarding the way in which motives can be an object
of preference for agents is that what we care about bears on the experiential
quality of our lives. In many cases, experiencing the object of one's desires as
uniquely valuable contributes to the richness of a human life, a richness that we
cherish and would regret losing. Some projects and interests have greater
personal importance for us because the experience of having those interests is
itself life enriching, and is part of what individuates us as unique human
beings. We recognize that if we did not find music (or sports or philosophy)
intrinsically desirable, we would be cut off from distinctive ways of
experiencing the world, a fact that connects with the phenomenological
distinguishability of different modes of desiring.6 3
Most people, I take it, would recoil at the idea of a life without what are
widely regarded as virtuous motivations: a sense of moral duty, kindness
towards others, or an interest in exercising our intellectual faculties. These
forms of motivational concern are personally valued by agents at least in part
for the experience of having them-being relevantly motivated constitutes the
expression of capacities in us that we cherish, and having these forms of
concern defines the kinds of people we perceive ourselves to be.6 4 As a result of
valuing these motivational capacities in ourselves in this way, we take pleasure
in discovering similar capacities in our peers. We feel that the motivational
capacities are good for them in the same way that they are good for us: they

63.

Note that where Mill asks us to focus on the experiential quality of pleasures generally, I am
instead drawing attention to the specific (positive) experience of having desires we
reflectively endorse, distinct from the pleasure derived from sating desires.

64.

See generally CHARLEs TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN
IDENTITY 25-52 (1989) (discussing the way in which our identities are constituted by our
basic evaluative commitments and identifications and the relationship between identity
crises and normative skepticism); Frankfurt, supra note 59, at 10-12 (arguing that reflective
self-evaluation, as manifested in the having of second-order desires, is partially constitutive
of personhood and freedom of the will).
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enrich our lives by conferring a uniquely attractive tenor to our subjective
experiences.
Furthermore, we value virtuous modes of motivational concern (in
ourselves and in others) for the way in which they correspond with our
independent (and often inter-subjective) judgments of the good. What makes
possessing the "virtues" like a love of knowledge or ethical concern intrinsically
valuable to us connects with judgments of value that we make independently of
them. Thomas Hurka observes that there are various things (other than
motives) widely regarded by people as intrinsically good, like truth,
knowledge, or the welfare of others, and, as a result, there are more or less
fitting attitudes agents can take with respect to these basic things, given their
status as goods.6 s Crucially, having the right kind of motivational attitude
towards a basic good like social welfare -an intrinsic desire for it (one that
portrays social welfare as desirable for its own sake) -becomes a distinct
intrinsic good in virtue of social welfare's normative status. That is to say,
people who value social welfare or knowledge or personal achievement
experience normative pressure to have an intrinsic desire for these things (and
to value a similar desire in others), not merely because such desires conduce to
more knowledge, or personal achievement, or social welfare, but because
desiring the basic goods intrinsically is an appropriate attitudinal response to
(and a way of recognizing) their status qua goods.66 Our independently held
values thus generate corresponding second-order desires in us to cultivate and
nourish motives like love of knowledge and ethical concern for their own sake.
When we discover similar motives in others, we reflect favorably on
their capacity to recognize and be moved appropriately by what we regard as
the good.
Hence, the cost of denying that there are motivations that are inherently
better or worse for us is great. A denial would go against the force of our own
experiences. The distinctions we make between better or worse values, even if
bound up with our subjective ways of experiencing the world and our situation

6s.

THOMAS HURKA, VIRTUE, VICE AND VALUE

11-15

(2001).

While Hurka considers

motivational/affective attitudes towards basic goods generally, I have focused on intrinsic
desires for ease of discussion.
66. It is worth noting, at this juncture, the remarkable inter-subjective agreement that our
normative evaluations routinely achieve. When a person fails to connect with and be moved
by certain goods-truth, beauty, moral virtue-we are often able to persuade them to
change their personal commitments, perhaps by clarifying what is, in their considered and
reflective moments, important or valuable to them, or by correcting their false beliefs about
the world.
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in it, have tremendous importance for us individually and collectively. 6 7 Our
cares bear on the quality of our lives, constitute our very identities, and
determine whether we are appropriately oriented towards what we regard, in
our considered moments, as the good.
C. How Motives Enable Valued Ways ofRelating with Others
The argument of the previous Section shows that we have preferences
regarding the kinds of motivated beings we want to be. The argument reveals
that intrinsic motives can be valuable, quite apart from the behavioral
outcomes they lead to; they are valued for the life-defining experience that is
having them, and for their being fitting responses to what we independently
value.
A different argument for why the character of our motives matters appeals
to the role of motivation in enabling certain kinds of relationships between
people. In what follows, I point to the fact that the very possibility of valued
ways of relating with others depends on our having the capacity for certain
ways of desiring. In other words, motivations matter because relationships
matter. This does not amount to an instrumental account of the value of
appropriate motivations, because the valued relationships are constituted by

67.

Philosophers have tried to explain the distinctions of worth we make in various ways. Under
a view often ascribed to Plato, our judgments of the good are determined by our coming
into contact with transcendent sources of the good, such as a timeless set of (non-natural)
moral facts. See JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG 23 (1977) ("In
Plato's theory the Forms, and in particular the Form of the Good, are eternal, extra-mental,
realities. They are a very central structural element in the fabric of the world."). Such a view
will strike many as metaphysically implausible. More plausibly, others have argued that our
normative distinctions are bound up with our subjective experiences of the world and our
situation in it. See generally SIMON BLACKBURN, RULING PASSIONs: A THEORY OF PRACTICAL
REASONING (1998) (arguing that normative evaluations can be authoritative even if
grounded in our emotions and motivational concerns). As Harry Franldirt puts it, the
objectivity of normative truths
consists just in the fact that [they are] outside the scope of our voluntary control.
Normative truths require that we submit to them. What makes them inescapable,
however, is not that they are grounded in an external and independent reality.
They are inescapable because they are determined by volitional necessities that we
cannot alter or elude. In matters concerning practical normativity, the demanding
objective reality that requires us to keep an eye out for possible correction of our
views is a reality that is within ourselves.
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, TAIGNG OURSELVES SERIousLYAND GETTING IT RIGHT 34 (2006). My
own view can be grounded in a similar metaphysics ofvalue.
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the relevant motivations. To put the point a different way, to value
relationships isin part to value certain modes of motivational concern, not only
in ourselves but also in others.
Take the case of friendship. For a friendship to obtain between two people,
the attitudes that they have towards one another must have certain features. 68
Reciprocal affection, for instance, is widely regarded to be at the core of the
kind of relationship a friendship is. But affection is hardly ever enough. Friends
have standing intentions to help one another in difficult situations. Friends not
only take pleasure in each other's company, they often share personal projects
and interests. Moreover, the good of friendship-why we value it-is itself
dependent on the kind of regard that friends bear towards one another; we
value being around people who cherish us and with whom we share our
personal commitments. This fact becomes especially vivid when we consider
the ways in which friendships can become impaired. If a friend who once
respected and cared for you becomes drawn to you for self-serving reasonssay, a desire to get ahead socially or profit financially-so much so that the
original motives of love and respect are diminished, the change in feelings
towards you would not only undermine the quality of the friendship, it would
preclude, I think, the very possibility of a friendship. The fact of this
impairment is independent of whether or not the person's actions change. All
that needs to change to undermine a friendship are the motives behind the
actions: the character of the internal regard.
To generalize from the friendship case, relationships involve (indeed, are
constituted by) intentions and expectations regarding how parties feel towards
one another, and the reasons they will be disposed to act upon.6 9 Certain kinds
of valued relations between individuals are made possible precisely because
individuals have the capacity for projecting good will and proper respect
towards one another. Unsurprisingly, a number of moral philosophers have

68. See T.M. SCANLON, MORAL DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BIAME 131-35 (2008)

(discussing the norms of friendship).
69.

Id.

7o.

For an example of valued relations between producers and consumers in market settings, see
Schultz, supra note 49, at 675-91, which describes the relationship that the fans of the
Grateful Dead are able to have with their favored musicians because of the norms of
reciprocity that both parties have internalized- one characterized by trust, intimacy, and a
sense of co-participation in the artistic enterprise. Schultz is ultimately interested in how
this relationship leads to compliance with copyright law and seems to neglect that the
relationship and its constituent motivational concerns might be inherently valuable to both
parties.
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grounded the obligation to be moral in the fact that when we cultivate basic
forms of ethical regard for others, we make possible relationships in society
that are intrinsically and immeasurably valuable. 7 '
D. An Incentive's Effect on the Motives We CareAbout
The conclusions advanced in this Part so far-that the character of our
motivations matters because (i) we think of motives as differentially valuable
in their own right, for the way in which they enrich our lives and orient us
towards the good; and (2) we have an interest in preserving certain valued
ways of relating with others-provide us with all the resources needed to
develop an external critique of incentives, one that focuses on the motivational
transfer incentives cause.72

71.

See, e.g.,

SCANLON, supra note 68, at 139-41; see also PAUL WEITHMAN, WHY POLITICAL
LIBERALISM?: ON JOHN RAWLs's POLITICAL TURN 133-34 (2011) (describing Rawls's view that

a desire to act on just principles is reinforced by the desire for friendship, association, and
social harmony).
72.

My view should be distinguished from those that have recently been developed by scholars
working on the ethics of incentives. Michael Sandel, in his 2012 book, What Money Can't
Buy, advances a thesis similar to my own. Sandel's basic idea is that "we corrupt a good, an
activity, or a social practice whenever we treat it according to a lower norm [or motivation]
than is appropriate to it." SANDEL, supra note 6, at 46. His discussion is grounded in the
intuition that certain kinds of good activities - studying in school, say-are corrupted when
we engage in them out of a desire for monetary gain as opposed to being motivated by
higher values like a sense of the importance of learning for its own sake. Sandel does not
appear to help himself to a systematic theory of what makes motives like ethical concern
higher motives than desire for money. In contrast, I offer such a theory by appealing to the
considered preferences of agents. A more subtle difference between Sandel's view
and mine - but one that, I believe, makes my position more plausible - stems from the fact
that Sandel conflates, or, at the very least, fails to clearly distinguish, a moral evaluation
of the outcome of an incentivized act with an evaluation of the motives underpinning it. See
id. at 45-46.
My view is also distinguishable from Ruth W. Grant's, as developed in her recent work
on the topic. RUTH W. GRANT, STRINGS ATTACHED: UNTANGLING THE ETHICS OF
INCENTIVES 57 (2012). While Grant seems attuned to some non-instrumental concerns raised
by the use of incentives, her principal focus is on the way in which incentives can be
instruments of power, and on the standards governing their legitimate use. Id. at 5-6. She
rightly notes, for example, that motivating individuals through incentives often circumvents
public discussion and consent, which seems contrary to democratic principles and the
respect owed to free and rational persons. Id. at 7-56. She also notes that incentives can
affect the character of the parties involved, and the way in which they do bears on their
legitimacy. Id. at 51-52. Her account portrays the value of character in largely instrumental
terms, however. Id at 53, 114-116; see also Ruth W. Grant, Ethics and Incentives: A Political
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As the studies discussed in Part II suggest, incentives alter our motivations,
and they do so in a way that is not immediately noticeable to agents. The main
psychological theories of the crowding out effect emphasize that an agent's
capacity for intrinsic motivation depends on her sense of herself as capable of
self-initiated choice, and on her attentiveness to intrinsic considerations as
reasons for acting. A goal pursued out of a sense of its intrinsic worth offers an
actor occasion to reflect on its being valued in this way -a mode of reflection
that likely has an educative and fortifying effect.7 ' Because extrinsic prompts
direct the agent's attention away from such reflection and towards purely
extrinsic considerations for acting, intrinsic motives are rendered vulnerable.74
Moreover, the weakening of intrinsic motives can occur so gradually as to
render agents oblivious to the change occurring in their personalities. After all,
we do not constantly invigilate the immediate content of our mental life.
Instead, we notice changes in habits or dispositions once the change in us is
already entrenched. Hence, the motivational change that incentives cause by
bypassing conscious reflection may result in a change in our desires that we
cannot reflectively endorse as an improvement in our way of life.7s
The proliferation of incentives through the law threatens to obstruct the
cultivation of virtuous dispositions by blocking occasions for their habitual
exercise, thereby rendering a shift in values that is difficult to endorse. Under
an incentives regime, actions that might have provided individuals occasion to
exercise (and reflect upon) a sense of civic duty, or moral regard, or other
motivations that are generally held in high esteem, no longer do so because

Approach, ioo AM. POL. SCI. REv. 29, 36 (2006) (noting that the undermining of character
can lead to fewer altruistic acts). Grant's account would be considerably strengthened by a
systematic explanation of why character might matter intrinsically.
73.

74.

See supra note 25.
The recognition that we fortify virtue through practice is, of course, a familiar thought. See
NIcoMACHEANETHICS 1103B (H. Rackham ed., 1934) (c. 384 B.C.E.) ("[I]t
is incumbent on us to control the character of our activities, since on the quality of these
depends the quality of our dispositions.").

ARiSTOTLE, THE

75.

As Harry Frankfurt observes, our ability to form a division in our minds, to step back from
our desires and reflect on them, entails the possibility that we may not "approve of what we
notice ourselves feeling . . . [or] want to remain the sort of person we observe ourselves to
be. . . ." FRANKFURT, supra note 67, at 171. Circumstances that shift the motives of agents in
a direction we think they would, in their reflective moments, bemoan, are regrettable for
that reason. See, e.g., Kennon M. Sheldon et al., The Independent Effects of Goal Contents and
Motives on Well-Being: It's Both What You Pursue and Why You Pursue It, 30 PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 475, 476 (2004) (observing that extrinsic control affects well-being
negatively).
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agents are redirected into acting out of a fear of sanction or a desire for
monetary gain. When extrinsic legal considerations become a person's reasons
for acting, they deprive her of the experience of desiring personal achievement,
knowledge, and general welfare for their own sake - an experience that, as
noted, is crucial to the fortification of intrinsic motivation. The resulting
erosion in virtue generates a real risk of impoverishing the lives of individuals
and the relations they hope to realize with their fellows. The danger under an
incentive regime is a transition in the personal commitments of agents that
cannot be understood either as deliberately chosen or as normative progress.76
Consider, for example, the Dodd-Frank Act,n which creates significant
financial incentives for whistleblowing by employees when employers are
engaged in fraudulent or otherwise wrongful behavior." If the incentives
created by the Act crowd out ethical motives to blow the whistle on
wrongdoing-a serious possibility, as the evidence suggests79 - it renders
persons engaged in commerce even more beholden to financial interests, a fact
that might be genuinely regrettable to them. By shutting down a means for
cultivating a sense of commercial decency, the law diminishes ethical behavior
engaged in for its own sake. Similarly, the tax regime, in an ostensible effort to
incentivize charitable donations, offers taxpayers a financial benefit in return
for their largesse: the charitable deduction allows the donor to reduce her tax
liability by sheltering part of her income relative to the amount of her
donation.so In fact, taxpayers can generate direct monetary gains as a result of
the charitable deduction rule, through a series of transactions incorporating a
charitable gift as an element." The tax benefits of charitable donations thus
generate an additional legal reason for donating to charity, and this added

76.

On the importance to the agent of understanding new norms and motivations as normative
progress, see TAYLOR, supra note 64, at 72, which explains that "[w]e are convinced that a
certain [normative] view is superior because we have lived a transition which we understand
as error-reducing and hence as epistemic gain."

77. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.

111-203, 124

Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
78. Ben Kerschberg, The Dodd-Frank Act's Robust Whistleblowing Incentives, FORBES, Apr. 14,
2011, http://www.forbes.com/sites/benkerschberg/2o1/o 4 /14/the-dodd-frank-acts-robust
-whistleblowing-incentives.
1151-52 ("[T]he findings indicate that in some cases
offering monetary rewards to whistle-blowers will lead to less, rather than more, reporting
of illegality.").

79. See Feldman & Lobel, supra note 5, at

See 26 U.S.C. § 170 (2oo6).
S. Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV.

8o.

1133, 1135 (2008).

1097

THE YALE LAW JOURNAL

123:1070

2014

reason may be enough to regrettably alter the motivations of those who would
have otherwise donated exclusively out of a sense of altruism. Those habituated
into thinking of charitable donations as a means for personal gain may fail to
cultivate ideal levels of generosity and good will or, alternatively, cheapen their
mode of relating to their beneficiaries.
I will say more about the legal application of the moral insights canvassed
in this Part, but for now it suffices to note that the law's influence on our
motivations for acting can be normatively evaluated quite apart from any
ultimate effect on behavioral outcomes. By shifting our norms, the legal system
potentially disables us from realizing the idealized versions of ourselves, and
impairs relationships that are worth preserving. One conclusion of this line of
thinking is that not pushing or prodding private actors may afford them the
best opportunities for cultivating habits and motivations we care about.
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW AND REGULATORY DESIGN

To be clear, the arguments advanced so far are not meant to lead to any
definitive conclusions about the use or disuse of incentives. One may
consistently note all of the above, agree that incentives in certain cases have an
inherently regrettable effect on our norms, and yet insist on incentivizing
agents because it does so much good. Nevertheless, what I hope to show here
is that reflection on the harms inherent in the effect of incentives on people's
motivations can be productively applied to doctrinal analysis and legal design.
Indeed, the refraining of the crowding out effect illuminates a novel mode of
analyzing a range of legal phenomena.
An appreciation that the crowding out effect matters morally quite apart
from its effect on behavioral outcomes is legally helpful in a variety of ways.
First, certain features of legal doctrine can be partly explained or normatively
justified by appeal to the moral insights canvassed in Part III. Second, the
insights offer a new lens through which to compare and evaluate bright-line
legal rules against more open-ended legal standards. Finally, I point to some
other lines of legal application.
A. The Law ofNature Restriction on PatentableSubject Matter
The patentable subject matter inquiry helps to determine the eligibility of a
proposed invention for patent protection. Whether an invention constitutes
patentable subject matter is a threshold question that is wholly distinct (at least
in theory) from questions concerning the novelty or usefulness of a proposed
invention. Section loi of the Patent Act defines the scope of patentable
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subject matter as including "any . . . process, machine, manufacture or
composition of matter.""'

Despite the broad language of § io, courts have carved out exceptions to
what can be patented. In particular, courts have held that "laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas" are not appropriate subjects of
intellectual property.8 ' So, for instance, a naturally occurring bacterium, even if
its discovery involved considerable efforts on the part of the discoverer, cannot
be patented because it falls under the "physical phenomena" exception.
Similarly, Einstein could not secure a patent for the theory of relativity.8 4 Such
discoveries are "manifestations of . . . nature, free to all men and reserved
exclusively to none."8 s
Naturally, such categorical exceptions have significant consequences for the
integrity of the patent system as well as for scientific progress. "The rule
against patenting nature denies monetary reward to some of the greatest
discoveries. Einstein, Newton, Faraday, Pythagoras - even Prometheus - could
expect short treatment from the Patent Office, because their '[e]poch-making
"discoveries"' fell on the wrong side of principle and application." 8 6 Insofar as
the patent system is designed to encourage discoveries and inventions
that benefit mankind, it is not at all obvious why society's greatest benefactors
should be denied reward. As a result, how the exception is to be understood
principally and in relation to the rest of patent law doctrine becomes a pressing
issue.
A popular policy rationale for the exception asserts that awarding the
discoverer of a natural law (or abstract idea) a monopoly on its use would
create too large a deadweight loss, on account of the limited access to the law,
to justify creating the ex ante incentive. Laws of nature are regarded as "basic
tools" necessary for research, and the foreclosure of private, unlicensed use of
these basic tools would impose too much of a cost on society, making
incentives in the domain of scientific investigation cost-prohibitive."

5

82.

35 U.S.C.

83.

See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.

84.

Id.

85.

Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).

86.

Alan L. Durham, Natural Laws and Inevitable Infringement, 93
(2009) (footnotes omitted).
See, e.g., id. at 958-59. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES &

87.

101 (20o6).
303, 309 (1980).

MINN.

L. REV. 933, 950-51

A. POSNER, THE
(discussing the incentive-

RICHARD

ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw (2003)

based underpinnings of intellectual property).
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Alan L. Durham considers the "basic tools" explanation, along with other
theories that have been offered to explain the doctrine, and persuasively argues
that conventional explanations are highly unsatisfactory. In many cases it is
not at all obvious that the total deadweight loss of granting a temporary
monopoly on a natural discovery would undermine the justification for
awarding ex ante incentives to would-be discoverers. After all, the doctrine
forbids the granting of patents even if the discovery of a natural law or abstract
idea involved exceptional efforts that might otherwise go uncompensated. As
the court in Morton v. New York Eye Infirmary observed, it does not matter
"what long, solitary vigils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may have
been wrung from the bosom of Nature.""' The patentees in that case had
discovered the principle of anesthesia! As Durham points out, "[t]he practical
value of the discovery can hardly be overstated, as the surgeons who testified
made plain."9 o The court voided the patent, characterizing the discovery "as
one concerning the natural effects of a known substance on the human body." 9'
Furthermore, Durham points out that broad claims - that is to say, claims that
are likely to foreclose a wide range of useful unlicensed activity-are not
disqualified, generally, as a matter of law. "Some 'pioneering inventions,' those
that open up vast new possibilities, receive broad claims without demur."
Hence, the justification for disallowing patents on "basic tools" of research
cannot appeal exclusively to the broadness of the patent claim.
Durham considers alternative justifications for the doctrine, including ones
that derive from the natural law tradition.93 I cannot present here in a clear or
convincing manner all of his various critiques, or his own view that the

88. See Durham, supra note 86, at 960 ("Disallowing patents to natural laws and phenomena
might withhold necessary incentives at the very point where they are most needed, while
failing to protect those willing to share their discoveries."); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Wisdom of the Ages or Dead-Hand Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods
After In re Bilski, 3 CASE W. REs. J.L. TECH. & INTERNET, no. 1, 2012, at 1, 7 ("[C]urrent
patentable subject matter doctrine suffers from a lack of clarity not only as to what the
applicable rules are, but also as to what those rules are supposed to accomplish.").
8g. Morton v. N.Y. Eye Infirmary, 17 F. Cas. 879, 884 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1862).
go. Durham, supra note 86, at 951.
91.

Id.

92. Id. at 958 (footnotes omitted).
93. See Durham, supra note 86, at 948-61; see also Alan L. Durham, The Paradox of "Abstract
Ideas," 2011 UTAH L. REV. 797, 844-50 (considering the following explanations for the
exception: abstract ideas are not "invented" in the right way; they are not useful; the
associated claims are too broad; the subject matter represents a basic tool of research).
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doctrine might be justified by appeal to the fact that it would be very hard to
distinguish as a legal matter economically exploitative uses of patented natural
phenomena from uses that were inevitable and harmless to the patentee. 94
What I would like to do instead is explore a way of solving the puzzle about
patentable subject matter that the existing literature appears to have neglected.
A rule that denies patents to discoverers of natural laws, physical
phenomena, and abstract ideas, may serve as a means for reinforcing and
preserving the valued motivations that underpin efforts in the arena of basic
science. The motivations of the great theorists (and other participants in the
scientific enterprise) -motives like the love of knowledge for its own sake, an
interest in the general welfare, and the desire to exercise one's intellectual
faculties - may need insulation from the crowding influence of monetary
incentives. We clearly cherish the fact that our intellectual culture breeds
theorists and discoverers who adopt values greater than monetary gain, values
that we think are intrinsically worth having. 95 Theorists like Einstein acquire
heroic status because they inspire us with their single-minded devotion to the
cause of humanity and scientific progress for its own sake. It is the very
possibility of that heroic identity -one constituted by and valued for a set of
motivational concerns -that is endangered by a patent regime that introduces
incentives in the arena of basic science.96

94. See Durham, supra note 86, at 983 ("None of the cases on patentable subject matter, even

those dealing with 'mental steps,' pose this issue of the unwilling infringer paralyzed by the
burden of knowledge.").
95. In fact, Durham briefly considers the possibility that what justifies withholding incentives
from some of society's greatest discoverers is that "higher interests than monetary reward"
motivate theorists like Einstein and Faraday. Id. at 953. Durham dismisses that possibility
far too quickly, on the (mistaken) grounds that it would seem unnecessary to create a
doctrine blocking their pursuit of patents if most discoverers of natural laws and physical
phenomena were motivated by higher interests. Id. at 953-54 ("[I]f scientists of Einstein's
caliber were indifferent to financial gain, it would seem unnecessary to create rules that
denied them patents they did not seek."). The aspects of the crowding out effect emphasized
in this Note represent considerations Durham neglects. It may be necessary to create rules
denying discoverers patents precisely in order to protect their motivations from crowding
out effects.
96. In 2006, the Russian mathematician Grigory Perelman became legendary upon turning
down the prestigious Fields Medal and a million-dollar-prize for proving the Poincar6
Conjecture. His explanation: "Everybody understood that if the proof is correct then no
other recognition is needed." John Allen Paulos, He Conquered the Conjecture, N.Y.
REv. BOOKS, Apr.

29,

2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2o1o/apr/29/he

-conquered-the-conjecture.
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Perhaps, then, the way to think about the natural law and physical
phenomena restriction on patents is by appeal to the fact that we wish to
preserve the unique norms that govern the scientific enterprise. Note that this
justification is resilient to the consideration that incentives might get us more
of the socially desirable discoveries we care about, even in the natural sciences.
I have no doubt that financial gain may serve as a powerful motivating force,
perhaps more powerful than such virtues as a love of truth and beauty for its
own sake. Nevertheless, more scientific progress, in that case, would come at
the cost of transforming the valued norms that govern the enterprise of basic
science. The crowding out effect would threaten to make less common
theorists who serve as an example -through their uncanny curiosity, sense of
altruism, and singular investment in the great project of mankind-for how
individuals should try to orient their lives. It would undermine the motivations
and ways of valuing that we think are inherently good for agents to have, and,
in our best moments, aspire to have ourselves.
The above explanation for the natural law exception may at best be a partial
justification for the rule. Certainly, judges need not be acting out of the
concerns I have raised. Nevertheless, even if the explanation I have offered here
fails as a positive account of why we have the patent regime that we do, it
represents an original normative insight into the natural law restriction, one
that gains in plausibility when we fully reflect on the importance of preserving
(and promoting) the intellectual virtues.
B. The Unenforceability ofDonative Promisesthat Have Not Been Relied Upon
The unenforceability of a promise to gift that has not been relied upon by
the promisee represents one of the foundational principles of contract law. The
standard analysis of the doctrine derives from the law and economics tradition.
Scholars in that tradition argue that the law reflects a (justified) skepticism
about the efficiency and value of gift giving, and, by refusing to enforce
donative promises, enshrines a policy determination that gifts are "unworthy of
being encouraged by the law."" Alternatively, one finds in the economics
literature various permutations and developments of the view, famously
espoused by Lon Fuller,' 8 that courts would face significant problems of

97.

Robert A. Prentice, "Law &" Gratuitous Promises, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 895-96 (noting
scholars who view gifts as a "drag on the economy").

98.

See Lon L. Fuller, Considerationand Form, 41
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process if they were to enforce promises to gift.'9 A promise to gift is a
gratuitous promise lacking in consideration- after all, the promisor does not
expect to receive anything in return -and consideration plays an "evidentiary"
function in contract law, by confirming that a promise was in fact made.'
The formality of requiring that promises, and contracts generally, be backed by
consideration also serves a "cautionary" function-it forces the parties to reflect
on what they are doing - as well as a "channeling" function - it is a means for
parties to signal to courts that the contract is legally enforceable. The
consideration requirement thus creates a procedural convenience for courts,
which renders gratuitous promises to gift unenforceable.
The law and economics tradition has been critiqued in the literature for
ignoring the way in which gifts are a valuable social good, and recent
scholarship has developed an alternative explanation for the rule.'o' Scholars
have argued that legally enforcing a promise to gift destroys the "giftness" of
the transaction and removes the benefit that promisees derive from the giftgiving activity.0 2 Enforcing the gift-promise "kills" the gift, because the value
of gifts derives from the fact that they are motivated by "affective values like
love, friendship, kindness, gratitude, and comradeship."0 3 Melvin Eisenberg,
for example, observes that
[u]nder an enforceability regime, it could never be clear to the
promisee, or even to the promisor, whether a donative promise that was
made in a spirit of love, friendship, affection, or the like, was also
performed for those reasons, or instead was performed to discharge a
legal obligation or avoid a lawsuit.1 4
The analysis of these modern writers is essentially synchronic, which is to
say that it focuses on the single time-slice of the gift-giving act. The law, they
point out, changes the reasons why the gift-giver complies with the promise,
when it forces compliance. One potentially devastating objection to their view
proceeds from the observation that the law merely changes the reason why the

9g. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The World of Contractand the World of Gift, 85 CAUF. L.
REv. 821, 823 (1997) (reviewing attempts to explain the doctrine that appeal to the problems
of process involved in enforcing gift-promises).
100. Fuller, supra note 98, at 8oo.
101. See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 97, at 932-33.
102. Id. at 934-35.
103.
104.

Id. at 934.
Eisenberg, supra note 99, at 848.
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gift-promisor ultimately complies with the gift-promise. The initial promise
may well remain grounded in motivations like love and affection; those
original motivations might be all that the beneficiary cares about, or else may
be sufficient to preserve some of the value that resides in the gift-transaction.
The law, this line of thought goes, only binds the hands of those who have a
change of heart, and by doing so may even enhance the meaning and value of
the initial gift-promise, considering that under an enforceability regime, a giftpromise reveals even more affection and kindness in virtue of the fact that it
legally binds the promisor.
The considerations that have been advanced in this Note can reinforce
modern views that analyze how the motivation-changing effect of enforcement
undermines gift giving, and also protect these views from the line of response
developed above. A diachronic,rather than synchronic, focus on the effects of an
enforceability regime on the gift-transaction, that is to say, a focus on the effect
of legal incentives on the motivations of gift givers over time, further
emphasizes how legal enforcement undermines the value of gift-giving. If
people routinely comply with gift-promises out of legal considerations, this not
only changes the motives that govern those particular instances of compliance,
but can also be expected to, over time, crowd out the norms and motivations
that make gifts valuable. Once a gift-promise has been made, the promisor,
under the current "under-incentivized" regime, must rely on her intrinsic
motivations -her love and affection for, and kindness towards, the promisee to make sure that she follows through with the promise.
In this way, the current regime forces promisors to exercise the motivations
that we care about. Quite apart from the fact that delivering on a gift promise
out of a fear of legal sanction partially changes the meaning of that particular
transaction between the gift giver and beneficiary -a dimension that theorists
have explored -the routine influence of legal incentives on gift giving behavior
may altogether shift our personalities in a direction we would later regret; a
direction that undermines ways of relating amongst individuals that ought to
be preserved.
C. The DecliningPopularityofHeart-BalmLaws
The breach of a promise to marry was once a prominent quasi-contract,
quasi-tort cause of action, created by the English ecclesiastical courts and
absorbed into English and American common law, through which a breaching
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party could be liable for punitive damages.'o The suits were most commonly
employed by "scorned" would-be brides, and frequently included arguments
that an engaged woman suffers a real harm from wasting her time in the
marriage market, enduring possible humiliation, and suffering loss of
reputation; additionally, she may have slept with the man under the false
expectation of a future marriage."o6 As the Seventh Circuit more recently
observed, "the action was originally used to pressure a reluctant lover into
fulfilling a marital promise."o 7
In the twentieth century, the cause of action fell into disfavor. Many states
passed laws prohibiting the enforcement of "heart-balm" actions.os Courts

began repealing the cause of action by judicial intervention.o 9 The reasons
cited for the change of heart (no pun intended) included the fact that the cause
of action had been "subject to grave abuses" and had been used as "an
instrument for blackmail by unscrupulous persons.""o Courts cited the large
damages routinely awarded,"' as well as the importance of freedom of personal
choice in matters of marriage and family life."' There was a growing
recognition that the "ideals that the action served ... [were] anachronistic.""'
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions continue to permit the cause of action. 11

105.

See Stanard v. Bolin, 565 P.2d 94, 96 (Wash. 1977) (observing that the cause of action for a

breach of a promise to marry recognizes tort-like damages).
106. See Margaret F. Brinig, Rings and Promises, 6 J.L. EcoN. & ORG.

203,

204-05 (1990).

F-3d 1475, 1479 ( 7 th Cir. 1995).
See, e.g., Breach of Promise Act, 1947 Ill. Laws 1181 (codified at 74o ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 15
(West 2013)); see also H.S., Note, Anti "Heart-Balm"Legislation,11 TEMP. L.Q.396 (1936).

107. Wildey v. Springs, 47
1o8.

log. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Barkes, 987 S.W.2d 772 (Ky. 1999) (eliminating the common law cause
of action).
11o.

Breach of Promise Act § I.

ill. Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1770, 1773-74 (1985).
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The relevant reason for the decline in popularity of the cause of action for
our purposes is the growing recognition amongst courts and legislatures of the
importance of "freedom of choice" in marriage and their discomfort at the
thought that the cause of action was often employed to threaten reluctant
lovers into marriage. Concerns about economic coercion may well be the
principal reason underlying the discomfort of contemporary lawmakers. But
heart-balm laws appear even less justified when one considers the fact that the
way that freedom of choice is exercised when marriage occurs in the idealthrough motives of love and affection-is itself valuable, and that it is less
than desirable for the law to crowd out motives and ways of relating in the
marital domain that are worth reinforcing by allowing them their free and
unrestricted exercise.
Even though individuals typically have a complex set of reasons for
marrying, and often marriage is entered into for reasons of convenience, it
seems quite natural to think that marriage in the ideal is an association between
two people characterized by love and affection. A legal system that undermines
the possibility of that ideal association, or distorts away from the ideal, is
regrettable. We care about why people enter into marriage, and if legal
incentives to fulfill a promise to marry distract from or altogether substitute for
the motivations we care about-the motivations that constitute the good of
marriage- then they may not be worth it.

D. Rules Versus Standards
The preceding discussion demonstrates that an appreciation of how our
motives matter generates insights into features of the law of patents, contracts,
and torts. Doctrinal rules can be rationalized by appeal to the idea that the
crowding out effect of incentives militates against their application in spheres
of human activity that are governed by valued non-legal norms and
motivations.
To firther demonstrate the benefits of being attentive to the intrinsic value
of norms, I consider a question of law with trans-substantive significance. The
question concerns the use of bright-line legal rules rather than more openended standards to guide individuals subject to the law's demands. The general
lesson of this Section is that the intrinsic value of norms can inform
the selection of the form that legal directives take. Even where legal incentives
are in play, there are ways of mitigating the morally regrettable effect on
valued motivations, and that is where the choice between rules and standards
becomes relevant.
In clarifying what the law requires, judges and legislators often have to
decide whether to couch legal directives in the language of standards or rules.
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Standards have the feature of being open-ended and abstract. They often
incorporate such value-laden concepts as "reasonableness," or "competency,"
or "wrongfulness." Determining how standards apply to a particular situation
to generate specific prohibitions often requires extensive fact-based and
normative analysis. In other words, "interpreters have to do a great deal of
work" to generate the relevant content of a standard-like legal provision."s
Bright-line rules, on the other hand, are more determinate and absolute. They
give clear instructions about how individuals are to act to stay within the
bounds of the law, and their interpretation does not require the elaborate
application of normatively thick concepts. A ban on "unreasonably fast" or
"excessive" driving would be described as a standard, whereas a prohibition
against driving over sixty miles per hour counts as a rule. Undoubtedly, there
are difficult cases that share features of both rules and standards, but the two
categories are nevertheless a helpful means for distinguishing legal directives
according to their form.
The comparative performance of rules versus standards has been
extensively discussed in recent scholarship.116 For instance, Duncan Kennedy
observes that "the two great social virtues" of bright-line rules are that they
limit uncertainty and official arbitrariness.
Private actors know well in
advance of official intervention what the law requires of them, and they adjust
their activities accordingly. Moreover, rules limit the risk of abusive exercise
of judicial discretion. On the other hand, rules are often criticized for being
excessively conservative and for leading to the wrong result when
unanticipated circumstances arise, because rule-makers cannot foresee all the
various situations in which their rules will be applied."" Incompletely specified
and normatively thick standards compensate for the deficiencies of rules,
but forgo their various virtues, such as certainty and protection against
arbitrary application.
My purpose here is not to evaluate the merits and demerits that have
already been identified in the literature, but to illuminate a new dimension to
the comparison. Standards have an ignored advantage over rules in certain

115.
is.

Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAUF. L. REv. 953, 965 (1995).
For a comprehensive account of the rules versus standards debate, see Duncan Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1687-713 (1976);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 1o6 HARv. L. REv. 22, 56-69
(1992); and Sunstein, supra note 115, at 969-95.

117. Kennedy, supra note 116, at 1688.
11. See Sunstein, supra note 115, at 957.
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contexts, one that is tied to the intrinsic importance of the character of our
motivations. When the law prohibits or encourages actions, the punitive or
monetary incentives generated often crowd out "higher motives" for desirable
behavior, and sometimes this is inherently regrettable. The substitution effect
of motivations undermines character and ways of relating with each other that
we care about. Normatively rich legal standards have the virtue of mitigating
the crowding out effect, and that is one powerful reason for their use in
contexts where we think that non-legal motives are especially worth
preserving.
Standards, recall, have the feature of often incorporating moral concepts
into the legal directive, so that interpreters have to engage in normative
reflection in order to determine what the law requires. Standard-like directives
that forbid "wrongful misappropriation" or "unfair use" or "unreasonable
speed" place moral demands on the interpreter, whether the interpreter is a
judge or a private actor. To determine what the law requires, the interpreter
must engage in normative deliberation. This feature of standards, I contend,
makes them reinforce the norms we care about, or at least mitigate the
crowding out effect, by forcing actors to think about non-legal reasons for
refraining from or engaging in a particular action. In contexts where the
relevant non-legal reasons generate wellsprings of action that we think are
worth preserving, an argument emerges for their application over rules. 1 9

ig. Seana Shiffrin makes a similar observation when she argues that standards are likely to
induce moral deliberation in agents: "Rather than applying a rule by rote, citizens must ask
themselves . .. whether they are treating one another fairly. . . ." Seana Valentine Shiffrin,
Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REV. 1214, 1217
(2010). Shiffrin contends that this facilitates the development of moral awareness and
"character traits strongly associated with democratic citizenship." Id. at 1233.
My own view is developed in a very different context, and draws a sharper contrast
between rules and standards. My interest in standards connects with their ability to mitigate
an effect that rule-based directives have -a change in the reasons why (or the motives upon
which) individuals act. The urgent dilemma facing lawmakers that I draw attention to is
their wanting, on the one hand, to ensure that adequate legal incentives exist in some
domain for agents to engage in socially desirable conduct, and wanting, on the other, to
preserve valued modes of motivational concern. Standards (uniquely) offer something of a
way out of this dilemma. A failure to deploy standards in such contexts involves the
frustration of a real policy interest due to the crowding out effect of legal directives.
In fact, recognizing the law's potential for crowding out valued motives is essential to
the broader point that both Shiffrin and I want to make. Although Shiffrin does not address
it, her thesis requires that standard-based directives be immune from crowding out effects of
the sort that laws generally induce, given the importance of good motives to the formation
of moral character. See supra Part III.

1o8

WHY MOTIVES MATTER

To explain the thought by way of example, consider a rule developed by
courts that interprets the Fourth Amendment-which prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures -in the context of police detention of a subject incident to
a search of his home. 2 o Suppose that the rule states that when the police search
a home pursuant to a warrant, they can detain a person incident to that search
only inside or immediately outside the home. Such a rule might be distinguished
from a more open-ended standard that states, for instance, that a suspect can
only be detained incident to a search of his home if the detention takes place as
soon as is reasonablypracticable. These contrasting interpretations of the Fourth
Amendment's requirements have, in fact, been extensively debated by the
various circuits, as well as the Supreme Court. 2 ' Notice that the "standard"
requires officers to reflect on what is and is not reasonable regarding the
detention of suspects. In deciding how long to delay before approaching a
suspect departing from his or her home, officers must ensure that their conduct
is governed by reasonable considerations. Reasonable considerations might
include a genuine fear of confronting the suspect in full view of neighbors. On
the other hand, officers would likely be prevented from delaying merely to
make the situation uncomfortable for the suspect. The standard forces officers
to reflect on the reasonableness of their decisions in the field and cultivate
positive habits. The bright-line rule short-circuits the cultivation of habitual
reasonableness by telling officers exactly what they can or cannot do. My
proposal, here, is that the standard reinforces norms we care about-moral
norms of behaving reasonably-andthereby mitigates the crowding out effect
of the legal incentive.
Perhaps a more illuminating example would draw on the legal prohibition
against "improper" or "wrongful" use of trade secrets. Unlike other forms of
intellectual property law, trade secret law imposes liability only for improper
acquisition of secrets.'"' While the Uniform Trade Secrets Act lists various acts

120.
121.

122.

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Compare Bailey v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1031 (2013) (holding that a departing suspect may
only be detained in the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched), with id. at 1045
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing for a standard allowing detention as soon as reasonably
practicable), and United States v. Montieth, 662 F. 3d 66o, 666 (4 th Cir. 2011) (adopting an
"as soon as practicable" standard).
See, e.g., UNIT. TRADE SECRETS ACT § i(2), 14 U.L.A. 537 (amended 1985) (defining
misappropriation as the "acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or
has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means"); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40 (1995) (defining misappropriation as
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that are considered improper, such as theft, fraud, or a breach of a duty of
confidentiality, the list is non-exhaustive.' Courts have interpreted the
wrongful use doctrine in creative ways to restrain, for instance, a defendant
from taking aerial photos of activities at a competitor's manufacturing plant."14
The fact that trade secret law has an open-ended "wrongfulness" standard at its
very center is often justified by appeal to one of the principal policy goals
underlying the trade secret regime: the maintenance of "standards of
commercial ethics," 2 s the enforcement of "morality in business,"112' and the
promotion of "fair dealing"'2 7 amongst competitors. Considering the
acknowledged importance of preserving ethical conduct in the commercial
sphere, one might wonder whether the presence of legal incentives undermines
the policy goal of trade secret law -after all, if competitors refrain from stealing
hard-earned secrets simply out of a fear of damages, then the evidence suggests
that whatever uniquely ethical motivations they might have for competing
fairly may be crowded out. This is where trade secret law's use of a standard is
(perhaps unintentionally) helpful. The standard forces participants in business
to reflect on what is or is not fair in order to determine what the law requires of
them. Trade secret law's directive, in other words, demands moral reflection,
and the exercise of ethical considerations.
Let me defend my hypothesis by appeal to some recent empirical research.
Yuval Feldman and Doron Teichman show that when the law raises the costs
of undesirable activity in a probabilistic way, the crowding out effect

123.
124.

"acquir[ing] by means that are improper ... information that the actor knows or has reason
to know is the other's trade secret").
UNIF. TRADE SECRETs ACT § 1.
See E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1017 ( 5th Cit. 1970)

("We ... need not proclaim a catalogue of commercial improprieties. Clearly, however, one
of its commandments does say 'thou shall not appropriate a trade secret through
deviousness.. . ..').
Ed Nowogroski Ins., Inc. v. Rucker, 971 P.2d 936, 942 (Wash. 1999) ("A purpose of trade
secrets law is to maintain and promote standards of commercial ethics and fair dealing in
protecting those secrets.").
126. Abbott Labs. v. Norse Chem. Corp., 147 N.W.2d 529, 533 (Wis. 1967); see also Kewanee Oil
125.

Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (noting that the maintenance of standards of
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diminishes.' A regime that asks individuals to pay upfront in order to engage
in a particular kind of behavior has a very different effect on intrinsic motives
than a regime that orders payment after the fact and only if the party is caught.
In the latter regime, the crowding out effect is attenuated. Feldman and
Teichman offer their own hypothesis for why we observe this attenuation.
They think that uncertain costs make the payment seem more like a
punishment, which makes the morality of the act salient. In contrast, certain
and upfront payments induce in agents the belief that they can purchase the
right to engage in socially undesirable behavior. My interpretation of the
results is subtly different. I suspect that in a regime in which the legal
consequences of undesirable behavior remain somewhat uncertain, the actor is
offered an opportunity to think about non-legal reasons that bear on the act. In
other words, the crowding out effect diminishes because the uncertainty gives
non-legal reasons and motives a chance to operate. The virtue that I claim
standards possess derives precisely from their open-textured and indeterminate
nature, and, in particular, from the indeterminacy generated by engrafting
normative concepts into their core.
Even if standards have the potential for facilitating normative deliberation
in the way that I suggest, the concern might be raised that private actors are
unlikely to engage in private deliberation about the meaning of standards
because they defer to interpretations of the law espoused by superiors or
counsel -interpretations that are based entirely on the anticipated construal by
courts of what standards permit. In particular, my suggestion that officers are
likely to reflect on what is and is not reasonable regarding the detention of
suspects when a standard exhorts them to behave reasonably might seem
especially oblivious to the realities of how police internalize the law.
There are several things to say in response to this worry about outsourcing
of standard-interpretation. First, it is not at all obvious that the operative
determination by private and institutional actors of what the law requires of
them always occurs after the involvement of counsel. Second, legal advice
cannot eliminate the necessary uncertainty that standards generate with respect
to what the law specifically requires. There will undoubtedly be exigencies
where guiding precedent is radically under-determinative, and where all that is
known about the law is that courts will apply a standard of reasonableness or
fairness. Counsel may well communicate that residual uncertainty to private
actors, which might be enough to allow for the exercise of valued non-legal
norms and motivations. Private actors may find it more efficient to simply

18.

Feldman & Teichman, supra note 42, at 225.
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cultivate the relevant virtues instead of always trying to act based on
predictions of what a court will interpret the law to specifically require. Third,
even if it is presently true that involvement of counsel precludes the benefits
that I claim standards possess, this is, after all, an artifact of existing lawyering
norms. My analysis, at the very minimum, suggests a possible state of affairs
that may be harnessed with the cooperation of lawyers and other legal actors. It
is hardly idle fantasy to think that lawyers can advise their clients while
fostering in them a sense of responsibility for internalizing legal standards.
Consider the example of the tax bar during the 1940s and 1950s, a period in

which the marginal tax rate was above ninety percent for the highest income
bracket.12 9 In this neglected era, the tax bar stressed the tax lawyer's duty to the
state, and saw itself as morally responsible for fostering amongst taxpayers a
desire to conduct their tax affairs "as honorably and ethically as the adviser
would himself act under similar circumstances."' In the interpretation of tax
doctrine-which is, it should be noted, replete with standards-tax lawyers
encouraged clients to consult their conscience. Experience suggests, therefore,
that lawyers can very much play an active role in helping private and
institutional actors internalize the normative attitudes - habits of
reasonableness and fairness -that the law, by announcing a standard, expects
those subject to its demands to cultivate.
Finally, the concern that deference to counsel prevents legal standards from
promoting virtuous modes of motivational concern can be avoided altogether if
we consider cases where standard interpretation cannot be outsourced. The
most obvious example of such a case involves the enforcement of lawyering
ethics by way of Rule 11 sanctions. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure oblige
lawyers to conduct an enquiry into the law that is "reasonable under the
circumstances" and to refrain from advancing baseless factual or legal
contentions.' 3 ' Lawyers must interpret the standard in their own case, and, in
so doing, cultivate habits that conform to the reasonable efforts required by the
law. The example provides further opportunity to emphasize the broader
point. It seems especially appropriate for lawyers to be motivated by a sense of
professional responsibility for its own sake wholly apart from the instrumental
ends this mode of motivation enables, such as the avoidance of Rule 11
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See Michael Hatfield, Legal Ethics and Federal Taxes, 1945-1965: Patriotism,Duties, and Advice,
12 FIA. TAx REv. 1, 3 n.5 (2012).
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sanctions, and the efficient administration of the legal system. The privilege to
practice law requires attorneys to conduct themselves in a manner compatible
with the administration of justice, which may well involve adopting an attitude
towards their work that reflects appropriate respect for the legal system. The
extent to which standards facilitate the inculcation of appropriate values
amongst lawyers thus militates in favor of their application over rules.
The insight that the incentive-driven undermining of norms is often
inherently bad can thus inform the selection of legal form. In contexts where
reinforcing ethical and intrinsic concern is important, standards have an
advantage over bright-line rules. Standards may mitigate the regrettable effect
on intrinsic motivation by enabling the exercise of non-legal reasons for acting.
E. Uncharted Waters: Moral Edification Through the Crowding Out Effect
A research paradigm that explores the effect of incentives on inherently
valuable motives can be fruitfully applied to other questions of law and policy.
I have not had occasion, in this Note, to discuss many other possible lines of
practical application. I gesture in the direction of some of these possibilities in
this final Subsection that I think deserve brief (if not fully satisfying) mention.
Perhaps paradoxically, there may be cases in which extrinsically motivating
agents, and triggering the crowding out of intrinsic or non-legal motivation,
may be the right thing to do, and precisely in virtue of the motivational
transfer. This possibility only has the appearance of a paradox because the
discussion so far has focused on the value of classically intrinsic forms of
motivation, such as affection for others, or a love of knowledge. There may be
activities, however, that are most appropriately pursued out of a sense of legal
obligation. Citizens extrinsically motivated to engage in those activities may
undergo a normative improvement.
Consider, for instance, laws that demand acts that are economically
redistributive. One might worry that a tax regime that creates sanction-based
incentives for the wealthy to support the poor crowds out charitable
motivations in the rich. But, in fact, it is not entirely clear which way the
crowding out effect cuts in this special case. Getting citizens to view their
financial contribution to the least well-off as a legal obligation may yet be
preferable to having them view it merely as a means for satisfying their
charitable urges. One could argue - as some have' - that the legal obligation
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would generate a more reliable pool of resources for the poor -but that would
reflect the familiar line that extrinsic motives are often better at getting us the
socially valued outcomes we care about. A mode of normative argument more
harmonious with this Note's paradigm would observe that respect for the law
is inherently a normatively better source of motivation than feelings of charity
in this special case. In making its case, that argument would need to engage in
a serious way with the nature of law; it would need to use a theory of legal
obligation to show that regarding one's financial support to the poor as a legal
obligation is the more virtuous and normatively accurate way of regarding
one's contributions. I can only sketch here how that argument might go.
The obligation to support the economically deprived is unlikely to be a
"solipsistic"'
moral imperative-one that derives from the contingent
demands that our internal capacities for empathy place on us. Instead, the
obligation likely derives from the fact that we choose to live together in society
with each other and under terms of social ordering that treat all members as
free and equal. Perhaps, the obligation is best experienced as a demand that
other members of society can rightly place on us. Suppose that some citizens
learn to respect the law precisely because it represents the terms of social
ordering necessary for fair communal living. Certainly, when people act out of
a sense of legal duty, they often do so not merely out of a fear of sanction by
the state, but out of a sense that the law is worth respecting because of the
normative ideals it represents-it enforces demands that members of society
can justly place on one another. In those cases, individuals who are made to see
their contributions to Social Security as acts required by law rather than acts
motivated by their sense of charity improve their way of regarding the act of
financial giving; the motivational change-in this case, from intrinsic to
extrinsic- represents a normative improvement on its own terms."'
Individuals who view their contributions as (strictly optional) expressions of
charity, motivated by pity for the poor, are, on this view, making a
fundamental moral mistake-and correcting that mistake has inherent value.
The law can thus be employed strategically to refine our sense of the grounds
of our obligations to each other.
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In describing the imperative as solipsistic, I am merely drawing attention to the way in
which the object of empathy (or pity, for that matter) is regarded by a morality that derives
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Admittedly, the precise benefit I am identifying is captured only if the
taxpayer complies with the law with the right attitude of respect for it. Those
who begrudgingly pay their taxes out of fear of sanction may not experience a
motivational improvement. If so, then the example is, perhaps, best
understood as reinforcing the need to encourage compliance with the law out
of respect for its ideals. It seems worth noting, however, that insofar as
expressions of charity have a patronizing component, one that portrays the
poor in an undignified light, even sanction-based compliance might count as a
normative improvement, given that it prevents the taxpayer, who would
otherwise act on pity-based motivations, from taking a condescending attitude
towards the economically deprived - an attitude we might believe for good
reasons to be less than virtuous.
There are still other possibilities that this Note's mode of analysis
illuminates that I have not explored for reasons of space.' Nevertheless, I hope
to have inspired interest, with the examples I've discussed, in the noninstrumental analysis of the crowding out effect, and its application to the law.
Incentives are undoubtedly a powerful instrument in the regulatory tool-kit.
Attending to their neglected but morally significant effects on our motivational
psychology is important precisely because of their pervasive use.
CONCLUSION

In this Note, I have emphasized a neglected normative dimension to a fact
about legal incentives - namely, the fact that incentives crowd out intrinsic and
non-legal reasons for acting. The crowding out effect is often regrettable
because our motives and non-legal reasons for doing things matter inherently.
Our motivations constitute who we are, and we have an interest in cultivating
certain dispositions and habits for their own sake. Moreover, valued forms of
caring-love, affection, reciprocal respect-enable valued ways of relating to
others. In light of these considerations, the motivational transfer that occurs
because of monetary incentives, and more generally when legal rules and
regulations induce human behavior, often represents an inherently bad
outcome.
This refraining of crowding out theory can be fruitfully applied to the
analysis of legal doctrine, and to questions of legal design. I have shown that

135. For instance, it may be possible to defend policies that erode financial incentives for hard

work by appeal to the importance of drawing on the higher motives that individuals remain
capable of.
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our reluctance to implement legal incentives in certain spheres of human
conduct-the scientific enterprise, marital relations, and gift-giving-may be
explained by appeal to our interest in preserving the non-legal motives and
norms that govern in the absence of legal intervention. I have also shown that
in various contexts, standards, as a legal form, have a special advantage over
bright-line rules, insofar as they counter the crowding out effect of legal
directives. This advantage becomes apparent when we take seriously the notion
that the preservation of non-legal motivation is both necessary and requires the
routine exercise of our virtues. I have briefly considered other legal insights
that come from taking the phenomenon seriously. The combined effect, I hope,
is to generate interest in a research paradigm that studies how a noninstrumental moral analysis of the crowding out effect can contribute to
debates about what the law should be.

116

